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1. Introduction
In early 1996, when New York City's rent control law came up for evaluation and
possible modification, the public debate spilled over beyond New York to national newspapers
and the international media. The questions that arose in this debate have arisen in the past in
discussions concerning rent control in other parts of the United States, Sweden, Germany, France
and India. These debates reveal, more than anything else, how widely the central issues of rent
control are misunderstood.
Two examples of this misunderstanding are as follows. First, a standard feature of the
debate concerning rent control is that the battle lines are typically drawn between landlords and
tenants, with the popular argument claiming that rent controls work to the advantage of terants
and to the detriment of landlords. In reality, the conflict of interest occurs between tenants of
different kinds, for instance between sitting tenants and  new tenants or between tenants who have
transferable  jobs and those with jobs that allow them to settle down in one place. The precise
manner in which this happens is explained by the models developed in this paper.
Second, what stirs most people against existing rent control laws in the US and elsewhere
(to the extent that they do stir them) are stories of people who have held apartments for many
years and now pay -'absurdly" low rents. Thus to John Tierney, writing in the New York Times
Magazine (Tierney, 1997), it is shocking that " ... Alistair Cooke still has his eight-room $2,078-
a-month apartment on Fifth Avenue with a park view .... " Similar accounts have been heard from
around the world. The old widow who lives in a large apartment in Delhi and pays a rent of 100rupees (approximately $3) per month is the kind of familiar story which gives rise to indignation
and shock. However, we feel that the reason for indignation in such cases is a misunderstanding of
the economics of rent control. Suppose Mr. Cooke or the old lady had bought the apartment
many years ago (for a price which today would appear absurdly small). This is equivalent to a
rental agreement which involves a lump sum initial payment and then a very small monthly
payment, in this case, zero. Should this be reason for shock and indignation? Should this be the
basis of saying that the old lady should return the apartment to the original owner or at least start
paying a higher monthly rent? Clearly not. She bought the place and that is the end of the matter.
But now, if a monthly rent of zero is no reason for indignation,  why should a monthly rent of Rs.
100 be treated differently? If the old lady pays a rent of Rs. 100 because that the agreement (or
generally accepted presumption) was that that is what she would do forever, then we could,
effectively, think of her as having bought the place under the agreement to pay in monthly
installments of Rs 100. Of course Rs. 100 looks very small today; but zero looks even smaller and
that is what a person who bought the apartment she lives in pays. In this paper we will argue that
there are important reasons for removing rent control, but the shock value of a low rent is not one
of them.
A part of the blame for the popular misunderstanding of the effects of rent control lies
with the economists. Despite quite a substantial literature on the subject, some of the key
analytical questions remain unanswered. The absence of a unifying  theoretical model has also
meant that the empirical work has often suffered by virtue of not being anchored to an analytical
model.
The aim of the present paper is to construct a general model which captures the main
stylized features of rent control around the world. One of the most popular forms of rent control,called "rent stabilization" or "second-generation rent control"'  allows landlords to freely choose a
nominal rent when taking on a new tenant (the tenant is of course free to reject the offer), but
places restriction on raising rents on a sitting tenant, thereby causing an erosion in the real value
of rent if a tenant stays on for too long, whenever there is positive inflation in the economy, which
for most economies is true most of the time. This means that landlords will prefer short-staying
tenants to long-staying tenants. Since this information, concerning "tenant-types,"  will be better
known to the potential tenant than the landlord, the tenancy market will be characterized by
asymmetric information. Our basic model describes the tenancy market as a model of asymmetric
information in which the tenant's types (whether they are long-stayers or short-stayers) are
exogenously given. It is shown that the presence of second-generation rent control can lock the
market outcome in a Pareto sub-optimal equilibrium, whereas a system of free contract can be
Pareto optimal. Of course, this does not mean that moving from one system to another would
result in everybody being better off. However, the model does illustrate how the real conflict of
interest is not between landlords and tenants, as portrayed in most popular debates on rent
control, but between tenants of different kinds.
We then move on to endogenize the tenant types. That is we allow for the fact that the
outcome in the rental market may affect the tenant's  life-style,  for instance, discouraging him from
shifting too many times or encouraging him to move whenever he gets a better job offer. Once the
tenant's  `type" is modeled as an endogenous variable we get the surprising result that rent control
may give rise to multiple equilibria. This is a very natural result which requires very little by way
of assumptions, but seems to have gone unnoticed in the literature. In case the economy gets
locked in the "bad equilibrium," among the many possible equilibria,  the removal of rent control
1  These are discussed at length in the next section.4
can not only bring about an efficient outcome but cause an across the board lowering of house
rentals, thereby leaving all tenants better off.  This is the central result of this paper and it is
established in section IV.  The remainder of the paper explores generalizations and discusses
policy matters.  The real world of course is never as tidy as our models; and so, it is argued in the
last section, the actual formulation of rental policy will require a combination of insights gained
from our model and commonsense.
We should clarify that all our comparisons of different rent-control regimes take the form
of comparative statics.  We do not consider switch-overs from one regime to another.  Hence all
of the policy prescriptions that flow out of this exercise concern new tenants and new contracts.
We do not comment on how or for that matter whether, there should be any changes of law
applicable to currently sitting tenants.
The next section is about the institution of rent control.  It discusses different kinds of rent
control, some stylized facts, and the real-world context of our theoretical constructions.
11. The Institution of Rent Control
In the United States and Europe the numerous governmental controls in the rental housing
market which are generally described as "rent control" arose during World War II in response to
the mass disruptions caused by the war.  After the war, New York City and many European
jurisdictions retained versions of these out of fear that the return of troops would cause demand
shocks and send rents skyward.  In other parts of the United States the social upheaval and high
inflation of the 1970's was a driving force behind the re-implementation of rent controls.
California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York are all states where
jurisdictions implemented rent control policies during this period.  While a number of jurisdictions5
have since abandoned or relaxed rent control laws, they are still commonly found in the U.S. and
all over the world. 2
Before we proceed to discuss rent control, it is worthwhile clarifying what it means for a
housing market to have no rent control.  There really are two kinds of"no  rent control:" (A) the
kind with no government intervention in the market and (B) the kind where the government
provides the foundation for contracting between agents and enforces the contracts by committing
to take punitive action against those who renege on their contracts. 3 While (A) describes the case
where there is no government involvement in the rental market, (B) requires active involvement of
the government.  In this paper when we consider a regime with no rent control, we shall be
concerned with (B), which will at times be referred to as a "free contract regime."  By the
converse of the above definition, we shall say that the housing market is "rent controlled" if
government fixes the rent or sets limits on rent increases or disallows the eviction of tenants,
irrespective of what contract the tenant and the landlord may have signed. Essentially rent control
is a generic term to describe rental laws which severely limit the contracts that landlords and
tenants are allowed to sign. For example, a landlord and a tenant may agree in principal to a
contract where the tenant stays for exactly two years and pays 10% more in rent each year, but
there can be a rent control law that considers this an invalid contract because it disallows
contracts that specify a move-out date, or which set rent increases too high.
While many different forms of rent control exist in the world, we will focus on a stylized
version which is widely used throughout the world.  We will focus on a rent control regime which
does not allow the eviction of a sitting tenant and which limits the amount a landlord may increase
- Arnott  (1995)  discusses  the history  of rent control in the U.S.  and Europe  and provides  a useful  bibliography.
3  There will, of course,  always  be some  restrictions  on the range of allowable  contracts. For instance,  you  are not
allowed  to stipulate  in a contract that the landlord  gets to kill the tenant if the tenant failed  to pay the rent on time.6
the rent on a sitting tenant (enough so that rents do not, typically, keep up with inflation). 4 Upon
vacancy, however, the landlord is free to negotiate a new rent with a new tenant.  This is precisely
the regime that exists in quite a few U.S. communities including Los Angeles, Berkeley, Santa
Monica and Palm Springs and similar to the system in Washington, D.C. 5 This is also a good
estimation of rent control laws in other communities in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world
including virtually all major cities in India.  In New York City properties under 'rent stabilization'
are closest to the rent control law just described.  In New York City there have been two major
rent control regimes, 'Rent Control' and 'Rent Stabilization.'  Rent Control was a strict regime
started in 1947 that assigned rents for individual properties and allowed only minor increases.
This policy currently covers slightly more than 100,000 units in New York City and is declining
with vacancy decontrol.  Much more common are properties under Rent Stabilization. This
system was implemented much later, in 1969, and was a less stringent form of rent regulation
where periodic rent increases are allowed.
While neither of these schemes were of the precise type studied in this paper, the Rent
Stabilization policy was similar. In this policy, there was, however, no provision for the resetting
of rents to market levels upon vacancy, but there were ways for landlords to raise the controlled
rent over and above the small increases allowed by the regulatory board.  One way was through
pass-through costs.  This allowed landlords who spent money on improvements to a rent
stabilized apartment to raise the rent by appealing to the board.  Another way was by pleading
hardship or increased operating costs.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that landlords raise rents
4 Section  6 of the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act. 1958,  allowed  a maximum  of  a 10%  rent  hike  every  three  years,  no
matter  what  the  inflation.  In India  the  average  inflation  every  three  years  has  exceeded  20%. The  Act  also  made  it
virtually  impossible  to evict  a tenant. The 1958  Act  has  subsequently  been  superseded  by  the  Delhi  Rent  Act.
1995,  which  is only  slightly  more  flexible.  As  far as inflation  adjustment  goes,  it allows  a rent increase  of  75%  of
the  annual  inflation  rate  based  on the  wholesale  price  index.7
through these channels often, even if the amount of money spent on improvements is small.  As
both of these tactics are sure to meet opposition from a sitting tenant, the common practice is for
the landlord to appeal for these increases upon vacancy. 6 New York City's rent control laws also
provided non-rent protection for tenants.  In particular, the Rent Stabilization Code stipulated that
landlords must offer tenants a renewal lease (at the stabilized rent) before the expiration of the
current lease.  It also limited the set of circumstances in which the landlord could evict a sitting
tenant (non-payment of rent, for example). 7 These provisions are essentially the non-eviction of a
sitting tenant clause that we stipulate for the stylized rent control law studied in this paper.
Our stylized model of rent control also resembles the rent control laws of both Germany
and France.  Franz Hubert, in describing German rent control laws, states that they provide
protection against eviction and, "while the initial rent of a new lease is freely negotiable, later rent
reviews are tied to the rent level of the recent lettings of comparable dwellings." He also states
that in France a similar law exists (Hubert, 1995).  Clearly if it is necessary to limit further rent
increases, the landlord is seeing some erosion of the sitting tenants rent with respect to the
market.  Indeed, Axel Borsch-Supan (1986) states about the West German rent control laws,
"...in a good approximation, the rent level for sitting tenants can be described as lagged average
rents of comparable units."  We feel, therefore, that our stylized version of rent control is indeed
quite fitting for many parts of the world and subsequently that the results of our model, and the
implications therein, are far reaching.
5Dreier  (1997)  and Olsen (1990)  describe  rent control  history  and programs  for many of the U.S.  communities  that
implemented  them. In Los Angeles  annual rental increases  for sitting  tenants are limited  to 7%, but once  vacated  a
new rent can be set without  any lirmits.
6 See Jarett  and McKee (1997)  for anecdotal  evidence  of the rent increasing  tactics of NYC landlords  as well as a
brief history  of rent control in New York City.
Cinque  (I997) discusses  the non-rent  protections  afforded  tenants  by New York  City's various  rent control laws.8
What is especially surprising about the poor quality of the popular rent control debate is
the fact that rent control is a well-studied subject in economics.  Yet examples of
incomprehension  abound in the popular press.  The most common example is where the rent
control debate is posed as a battle between tenants and landlords. For example, Billy Easton,
executive director of the New York State Tenants and Neighbors Coalition, is quoted in the New
York Times as saying about this belief that rents would increase dramatically if rent control were
abolished in New York City:  "Why would landlords be fighting [a continuation of rent controls]
so hard unless they stood to make a huge profit?" 8 This is a clear illustration of the mentality of
those debating this issue.  It may be true that tenants and landlords are battling over rent control,
but this is not a direct effect of the economics of the problem. In fact, much of landlord's
resistance is to the bureaucracy of the system.  In an editorial, the editors of the New York Times
write: "[rent  control]  ... is a bureaucratic  nightmare  for  small landlords  ..."9  We also believe  that
at times lobbies fight for causes which are against their own interests, because of their failure to
understand the ultimate consequences of different kinds of government action or legislation.
Indeed if this were not so, the raison d'etre of economists would be questionable.
What is perhaps more interesting is how often a symptom of rent control gets mentioned,
but rarely as a consequence of the economics of rent control, just as a side-effect.  This is the
tension between long staying tenants and short-staying tenants.  For instance in the same editorial,
the New  York  Times states,  "...  the leases of the very-long  term tenants,  ... tend  to be the
cheapest  in the rent-regulated  system ..."'  Louis Winnick,  Vice  Chairman  of the Institute  of
Public Administration, states about the financial struggles of co-ops in New York which have
s "New  York Senate  Leader  Vows  to End Rent Control"  bv Richard  Perez-Pena,  The New York Times,  December
6. 1996.
9  "A  Generational  Rent Gap" Opinion,  The New York Times, June 13, 1997.
l' Ibid.9
long-term tenants in their buildings: "Today's  co-op owners have learned something about the
economics of housing:  That rent regulations start battles not only between landlords and tenants,
but also between neighbors in the same building."'"  Economists also misconstrue the economics
of rent control.  Take, for example, economist Frank Branconi, executive director of the Citizens
Housing  and Planning  Council  of New  York,  who,  "...  advocates  for a modified  system in which
an apartment rises to the market price whenever it is vacated, and then the new rent is regulated
again for the next tenant." 1
2 This is exactly the stylized system that we study.  We show in our
model, that this system of rent control lead not just to Pareto sub-optimal outcomes, but possibly
to higher rents across the board.
There have been many empirical studies of rent control which are nicely summarized by
Olsen (1990), but the combined results, as one economist describes them, have been "...
disappointingly  uninformative."3 A few areas of general consensus have emerged however.  Rent
control has led to tenure discounts or lower real rents for long-term tenants (Borsch-Supan,
1986), and some evidence exists that turnover and therefore mobility  is lowered in areas with rent
control (Olsen, 1990).  Little convincing evidence exists to support the notion that rent control
hampers construction and maintenance.  Various studies of the Los Angeles rent control regime,
Olsen  (1990) reports,  "...  find very small transfers  in aggregate  from landlords  to tenants."  He
states, "the major transfers are from tenants who move frequently to those who seldom move."'4
Overall the empirical evidence suggests that the effects of rent control laws are higher rents for
new and short-term tenants, smaller increases for sitting tenants leading to lower rents for long-
stayers, and little effect on revenue for landlords (Olsen, 1990).
-Neighbor vs. Neighbor."  The New York Times, April 16, 1997.
'  Tiernev, New York Times Magazine.
'3Arnott (1995), p.  111  .
14 Olsen  (1990). p. 19.10
There has also been a considerable amount of theoretical work done on rent control.  The
common textbook version of rent control is a simple price ceiling model of supply and demand
that relates most closely to what Arnott (1995) describes as 'first generation'  rent controls.  These
are akin to the 'rent control' regime which New York City implemented in 1947, in which rents
were fixed at a level and rarely allowed to rise.  In this version, demand exceeds supply, and the
'winners' in the market are those tenants lucky enough to find housing.  For the landlords, rent
control limits the amount of money they can charge for their properties, and they see the market
value of their property fall and therefore neglect maintenance and upkeep. In addition, new
housing is not constructed as the expected return on such an investment is limited. Secondary
effects include mismatches of tenants to properties, with tenants holding on to large apartments
long after their need for the extra space has gone, reduced labor mobility, and increase in
discrimination and the rise of non-rent payments from tenants to landlords.
Advances on the textbook model have added variable quality of apartments to show that a
ceiling on rent may lead landlords to cut back on the quality component of the property, or
maintenance, which leads to a fall in renter's welfare and, under certain conditions, a rise in
landlord's welfare (Frankena, 1975; Raymon, 1983).  Arnott (1995) states that studies of what he
calls 'second generation' rent control laws, i.e. those similar to 'rent stabilization' in New York
City and our stylized rent control system, characterized by more lenient rent increase policies, are
not fully articulated, that only partial models exist.  Perfectly competitive models, such as
Sweeney (1974), look at both the dynamics of the housing market and quality differentiation.
Typically the landlord knows the rent function (which includes quality) and sets maintenance
expenditures (which impact quality) to the present value of net revenue.
Some models of imperfect competition view the market as monopolistically competitive
(Igarashi and Arnott, 1994) and are similar to the search models of Diamond (1984) andPissarides (1990) where potential tenants with idiosyncratic tastes look for housing in a
differentiated market.  Differentiated products allow landlords to price above marginal costs,
however free entry drives profits to zero with the result being vacant excess capacity.  Other
models, more closely related to our own, exploit the asymmetric information extant in the rental
housing market (Borsch-Supan 1986; Hubert, 1995; Hubert, 1996).  In Hubert (1995) tenants can
be more or less costly to service but landlords do not see the cost until a tenant has occupied a
property.  Bad tenants are forced out by large rent increases and are passed to other landlords
creating an externality problem which rent control could potentially avoid.  Arnott (1995) argues
that these studies suggest that there is scope for beneficial 'second generation' rent control.
There has also been some work done on the political economy of rent control, where both
landlords and tenants are considered political actors and can influence policy.  Fallis (1988) notes
that there are many more tenants than landlords and asks the question why is rent control not
more widespread. Epple (1994) models the rental housing market by considering two types of
tenants, permanent and temporary.  Permanent residents stay in a community so their numbers are
fixed while temporary tenants are transitory and their numbers vary.  Only permanent residents
vote on rent control policies and rent control in this case applied only to permanent residences and
is a price ceiling. This ceiling determines supply of housing.  When voting a permanent resident
does not know if he will be displaced from his permanent dwelling and also does not know the
number of temporary residents in the community. The permanent resident therefore weighs the
benefit of lower rent if he maintains his permanent dwelling and the cost of potentially finding a
new dwelling in a market with excess demand.  While the political aspects of rent control are
important, we treat rent control policies in the current paper as afait  accompli  and do not discuss
the political process that engendered them.12
What we aim to do in this paper is to fill the void in the rent control literature and present
a unified model of 'second generation' rent control, and show that Pareto sub-optimal equilibrium
as well as multiple equilibrium can arise.
III.  The Basic Model
Let us assume that there are n types of potential tenants in an economy.  If N is the set of
types, then  N  =  {1,  ,  n} . Suppose a fraction pi of all tenants are of type i.  Thus
pI +  '..  + pr,  =  1.  All agents in this paper are infinitely-lived.
A tenant's type basically refers to how long a tenant stays in the same apartment before
moving to a new one.  Let t; be the number of months a tenant of type i stays in the same
apartment.  Without loss of generality we assume that,
t,  <  t2 <  ...  <  tn.
In other words, type 1 tenants are the restless souls. Either they have a preference for quick
change or have transferable jobs.  Type n tenants are the types who gather moss.  Others are
somewhere in between those extremes.  Of course, in reality, depending on the rent-control
regime that prevails in an economy, a person may decide to quit a transferable job and take up a
stable  job or vice-versa.  But we will, for now, assume that the tenant types are given.  This
assumption is relaxed in the next section.
This is a model with asymmetric information. Each tenant knows his type but a landlord
cannot tell the tenant's type by looking at him. In addition, let us suppose that there is a rent-
5 See  Arnott  (1995)  for  a description  and  review  of past  theoretical  work. See  also  Smith,  Rosen  and Fallis
(1988).13
control law that does not allow quit-contingent contracts or rent escalation clauses for long-
stayers.  The monthly rent has to be fixed at the time of taking on a new tenant.
Note that even though a tenant's type is unknown to the landlord at the time the tenant
moves in, the tenant's  type gets revealed at the time the tenant moves out.  Hence, by charging a
lump-sum amount at the time of a tenant's moving out, a landlord can overcome the problem of
asymmetric information. A rent-control law typically prevents such complicated contracts and
thus causes the asymmetric information problem to persist (Basu, 1989).  Key money (or what in
India is called  pugree) with agreement to return a part of it depending on when the tenant leaves
may thus be viewed as the market's way to get around rent-control.  In our model we assume that
key money wt  ith contingent return is not allowed by the law.  In other words we are about to
analyse the case of 'second generation rent control,' as described in section II.
We will also assume that there is inflation in this economy which erodes the value of
money each month by 1- j3, which is greater than zero.  That is, we are assuming that there is
some inflation  in the economy.  This is empirically  very well-founded.  Among the 113 countries
for which the World Bank in its World Development Report 1997 gives the average inflation
during 1985-95, 111 countries reported positive inflation.
Let the discount factor for all individuals  be 6 E (0,1), for each month.
If a landlord charges a rent of 1 dollar per month in real terms from a new tenant and
somehow gets only tenants of type i, then the stream of income earned by the landlord, in real
terms, is given by
1  f  2  .- . -l  1  D 
2 ...  1
Given the presence of rent control, this stream of income is easy to understand.  Since the market
rent for a new tenant is 1, the landlord earns I in period 1. Since the rent control law does not14
allow the nominal rent to be changed, and the inflation rate is I-  f3,  in the second period (third
period) the I dollar is equal to ,  dollars (12  dollars) in real terms.  This explains the second and
third terms in the stream shown above.  After t periods the tenant quits.  The new tenant pays a
rent of I dollar in real terms (or  f3 '  dollars in nominal terms).  This explains why the tth  term is 1.
And so on.  The present value of the above stream using the discount factor of 6  is denoted by vi
and this is given by:
vi  =  1+p6  +(p6)
2 +  +  (fj6)
t -I  +  6
t 5i  v  (1)
or,
v-  t  (2) (1 -f6)(1  -- o)(2
Lemma 1  If i < j, then v; > vj.
Proof  We shall, without loss of generality, assume that tj  = ti+ 1. Let vjk  be the present
value of rents earned by a landlord whose first k tenants are of type i and all others of type j.
(Hence,  vjo  = vj )
We first show that vj 1 > vj. Clearly,
v,' 1  ,5  + (06v)2  +  ...  +()-  + 6ti v v~ 1 ~1±I3+(J36) 2±  (16) t j±  i  ~(3)
Since tj =  tik,  and given (4)  and (1), we  have
I  - ~  _  - (f06 ti  6ti+lvj vjl  _vi  =  6tivj(6)1-tj
=  a'i [(1 - 6)Vj  - ti
=  (-6)ti  v  0-o15
f ti
It is easy to see  v  >1-  (4)
The right-hand term is the present value of the stream  [t'  i,  *  ],  while vj is the present
value of the sequence  [I1,332,  - 1,,  12,  ..  ti ,1,  ]  The latter
sequence dominates the former, term by term.  Hence, (4) is true, and, therefore, vj' > vj.
It is easy to check, Vjk >  vjk-1,  Vk,  and that  lim v  k  =  v.  It follows that vi > vj.
[Q. E. D.]
Continuing with the case in which rent is $1 per month, let us denote v(i)  as the expected
present value of returns to the landlord when all tenants of type i or above make themselves
available to the landlord as potential tenant from whom the landlord randomly selects one.  Then,
clearly v(n)  =  vn. And, more generally,
v  :  nPk  1  =  |1 + p5 + (  +3B)2  +  ±(p6) t l +6tkV  ()]  (5)
k=i  Y~P
or
En  Pk  1  +  130  +  (13)2  +  +  (136)tk-1]
~j=j
V(j)  =  [  ]  1  1
-En  Pk  tk
k(=i 6 )j
(6)16
Since the above expressions are worked out assuming that the rent is one dollar (in real
terms for a new tenant), it is now easy to work out the expressions for the case when the rent is R
dollars. If the landlord gets only tenants of type i, we denote the present value of her rental
income as v,(R) and clearly
vi(R) = Rv;  (7)
where vi is given by (2).
If the rent is R and only tenants of type i and higher seek tenancy, we denote the
landlord's present value of income form leasing out one apartment by v(i)(R). Clearly,
v(i)(R) = Rv(j)  (8)
where v(i)  is given by (6).
Lemma 2  If i < j, then v(i)  > v().
Proof  Note that, for all k,
Vk  =1  +  p5  +  (8)2  +  ***  +  (go)t  k  +  °t  Vk
or
I +  0  +  (0)2  +  +  (o)'k  =(16  )Vk
Substituting this in (6), we get17
En|  Pk  kj 6 tk )V
or
n
~~  Pill  Pk  6t)k
E~~  pil_tjkV
n  n
V0  n  - n  (9)
E  Pj  - E  Pk  k
j=i  k=i
It is worth noting that if the term Vk  was not there on the right-hand side of (9) then the right-hand
side would be equal  to  1.  Hence,  v(i)  is clearly  a weighted  average  of vi, vi+ 1,  ..., and v,,.  It is also
evident that  if j > i, v(i)  is gotten  from v() by redistributing  some of the weights  away from v;j,
Vn  to vi,  , vi-. 1 Since,  for all k < j,  Vk >  vj  (by Lemma  1), it follows  that v(i) > vo).
[Q.E  D.]
As we discussed in the introduction, one of the most popular variants of rent control takes
the form of disallowing landlords from raising rents adequately or evicting tenants, even by
contractual agreement, this is commonly known as "rent-stabilization," or, in Arnott's  (1995)
terminology, "second-generation rent control."  For ease of analysis let us consider the polar case
of this by assuming that the rent-stabilization law takes the form of allowing landlords to choose a
rent, R, at the time of taking on a new tenant (who of course has the freedom to turn down the
offer); but then the rent remains (nominally) the same as long as the tenant stays on.18
Let us now model the tenant's  decision-problem under this rent control regime.  Let us
assume that all tenants have the same option (irrespective of their types) if they reject leasing an
apartment. This could consist of buying a property and settling down or living with a friend (we
are aware that 'friend' may be the wrong word if this arrangement persists for long).  This option
gives a person a life-time utility of B.  We assume that all tenants receive the same life-time
benefit from renting an apartment, A, and must, of course pay rent R, which, in present values
terms is Rv 1 for a type i tenant.  We assume that A>B, and define the difference, A-B, as D.
Therefore a tenant will lease an apartment if and only if, A - Rvi > B or  Rvi s A - B _ D.
What we mean by this, in operational terms, is this:  Irrespective of a tenant's type (which is here
exogenously given), if a tenant finds that the present value of rentals exceed, D, the tenant will opt
out of tenancy.
If a tenant is of type i, and the rent is R, the present value of rentals paid by the tenant is
clearly Rv 1, as in (7), with vi is defined by (1) or (2).  Hence, a type i tenant will opt for tenancy as
long as Rv, < D  By Lemma 1 we know that as R increases, the shortest-staying tenants (i.e. of
type 1) will be the first ones to opt out of tenancy, followed by types 2, 3 and so on with the last
to opt out being the longest stayers (type n).  Since the short stayers are the more attractive
tenants from the landlord's point of view, this is what drives the adverse-selection process in this
model.
Now consider a landlord who has one property to lease out.  Let E(R) be the landlord's
expected present value of rental when the per-period rent is R.  Following the argument in the
above paragraph, we can now compute what E(R) will be like as R varies.  An important and
interesting implication of this is the following.19
Lemma  3  E(R) reaches  its maximum  when R = D/vn.
Note that D/vn  is the critical  rent above  which  the longest-staying  tenants  opt out of
tenancy. The proof of Lemma  3 is obvious  with the use of a somewhat  unusual  diagrammatic
technique  that we develop  below. Let us first explain  how E(R) can be represented
diagrammatically.  Consider  a case where n = 3.  In Figure 1, the horizontal  axis represents,  R.  In
this figure  draw the lines  Rv 1, Rv 2 and Rv 3. By Lemma  1, Rv 1 is the steepest  followed  by Rv 2 and
then  Rv. or (what is the same  here) Rv 3. Draw a horizontal  line at height  D from the origin  and
mark  off the critical  rents,  namely,  D/v,, Div 2 and D/v 3 where each  type drops out of the rental
market. All  this is shown  in Figure 1.
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In the same figure draw Rv(l), Rv( 2) and Rv( 3).  Recall that Rv(i)  is a weighted average of
Rv 2, Rvi,F, ...  and, Rv,.  It follows that Rv( 3) coincides with Rv3.
Now suppose the monthly rent is below D/v,.  Then all three types of tenants seek
tenancy. Hence the landlord's expected present value of rentals earned (i.e. E(R)) is given by
Rv(I). Once R exceeds D/v 1, type 1 ceases to lease in property.  As long as R < D / v,,  E(R) is
equal to Rv( 2). Beyond D/v 2, E(R) equals Rv(3). Hence the landlord's expected present value of
rentals, E(R), must satisfy the following:
[Rv(  if  R<D/v,
Rv(2)  if  D/v,  <R<D/v,
E()  Rv  (3),  if  D/v,  <R<D/v,
0,  if  D/v 3 <R
The E(R) function is illustrated by the thickened line in Figure 1.
One easy implication of the definitions is that Rv(i)  <Rv; for all i < n.  It immediately
follows that all the peaks of E(R) excepting the one at rental, D/vn, will be dominated by the peak
at D/vn (as shown in Figure 1).  This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Note that if the opportunity cost of leasing property differed for each type, that is, the
opportunity cost to type i was Di instead of D, Figure 1 would have to be adjusted by drawing in
Di, D2.,  and D3 and locating the critical rentals D1/v 1, D2fv 2, and D3/V3. Lemma 3 would not then
be necessarily valid. However, the inefficiency results that we prove do not hinge critically on the
assumption of "equal opportunity cost."  And so, in view of its simplifying nature, this is an
assumption that we continue to use.
It is now easy to see the that if the rental market was monopolistic (in the sense of there
being one landlord with 1 property to lease out) then she would set the rent at D/vn. All but the2 1
longest-stayers would be driven out of the market in equilibrium. Consider the extreme case
where tn = x.  In this case rental is equivalent to sale by installment payment, where the
installment payments go on forever.
Let us now proceed to analyze what happens if there are many landlords competing with
one another as would be the case in any large city.  Let us assume that the cost to a landlord of
leasing out an apartment (in present-value terms) is C.  In order to consider the interesting case
suppose C < D.  It follows therefore that it is Pareto efficient to let all tenants have a rented
property each.  But let us see what the outcome will be under perfect competition.  By perfect
competition we mean here that (a) all agents are price-takers (which implies, in particular, that if
the market rent is R, a landlord expects to get no tenant if she unilaterally raises the rent to R')
and (b) there are enough (potential) landlords to drive profit down to zero.
The perfectly competitive outcome is easy to illustrate using the diagrammatic technique
developed above.  In Figure 2 we reproduce the E(R) curve.  Let us suppose that C is as shown,




D/v,  D/v,  R  R*  D/ v,  Monthly
R  Rent,  R
Figure  2
If the market  rent, R, exceeds  R*,  the landlords  wili  be making  supernormal  profits. So
there  will be more  entry of landlords  and R cannot  be an equilibrium.  If R is below  R*,  C > E(R)
and landlords  will  exit the rental  market. Hence  R  (in Figure  2) is the equilibrium  rent under
perfect  competition  when landlords  cost of leasing  out property  is given  by C.
Let us now consider  the case where  the landlord's  cost, instead  of being  C, is C'.  Then
there are two rental  rates, R'  and R" at which C'  = E(R')  = E(R").  Are both of these
equilibria?  It depends  on how exactly  we interpret  a "competitive  market." If by that we mean
that landlords  cannot change  rents in either  direction  (as in Mas-Colell,  Whinston  and Green,
1995,  Chapter 13) then both R'  and R"  constitute  equilibria.  However,  it seems  reasonable  to
argue  that while  landlords  cannot  unilaterally  deviate  from the market rent in an upward  direction,23
they can unilaterally deviate in a downward direction (without losing all tenants).  Then R"
ceases to be an equilibrium. First, we explain this intuitively; and then (at the end of this section)
we give it a formal game-theoretic interpretation.
The intuitive reason is simple. Suppose all landlords are charging R".  Then if one
landlord cut her rent to  R e (R',D/v 2 ),  all tenants would try to lease from this landlord and she
would make a positive profit, since (as is clear from Figure 2) E(R)  > C'.  Hence, R'  is the only
competitive equilibrium  in this case.
Let us see how different people are affected in equilibrium. By comparing Figures I and 2
it is clear that the cost of rental to types 1, 2 and 3 are R'v1,  R'v 2 and R'V3. By marking the
R'  point of Figure 2 in Figure l it is clear that R'vl  >  R'v 2 >  R'v-v and R'v 2 > C'  > R'V3 .
Hence the short stayers pay rents that are too high (above the cost to the landlords) and long
stayers pay rents that are too low (type I's do not rent at all in this market as R' v1>D).  This is
the real dividing line in the rent control debate.
Most of the popular divisions arise between landlords and tenants. If the law is going to
be changed on sitting tenants, indeed there would be conflicts of interest between landlords and
tenants.  But if the law is going to be changed for all future tenancy contracts (as it should be)
then the conflict of interest is between tenants of one type and another.  But these are such diffuse
categories that popular attention has mistakenly been directed at the more visible line between
landlords and tenants.
Return to the case illustrated in Figure 2 where the landlord's cost is C.  In equilibrium
everybody excepting the type-n tenants are driven off the market.  Yet for each tenant-type, i,
there exists a rental such that both landlord and tenant would benefit. This implies that under rent
control the competitive equilibrium can be Pareto inefficient.24
It the rent control law is revoked and replaced by a system in which a tenant and a
landlord can sign on any rental and eviction contract, it is easy to see that Pareto efficiency is
attained.  This is because the asymmetric information problem is not insurmountable here.
Though for a new-tenant his type is not transparent to the landlord, at his time of departure his
type gets revealed.  So by writing a departure-date contingent contract (or by putting in a rent-
escalation clause) landlords can get around the asymmetric information problem.  The problem
with most rent-control regulations is that they tend to disallow (or render illegal) clauses in rental
contracts which allow landlords to overcome the asymmetric information problem.
Let us, for completeness, consider the case where a landlord and a tenant can agree to any
contract and the state legal machinery  ensures that the contract is adhered to.  Under such a legal
regime, one kind of contract that would achieve optimality is a fully-inflation  indexed rental
contract.  Suppose a landlord writes a contract where the real rental is R each month.  In other
words, the nominal rent is raised each month sufficiently  to correct for the amount of inflation.
Under such a rental contract, the tenant type is unimportant to the landlord because no matter
who the tenant is, if the real monthly rental is R, the landlord's present value of earnings is
R /(1-  5).  If the cost of leasing out is C, the competitive real rental rate is R* where
R *
In other words, in a competitive equilibrium the nominal rent in period 1 is (1- 6)C = R*.
In the next month it will be  (1-  5)C / ,B. The following month (1-  o)C / 132  and so on.  As long
as C < D, all tenants will be leasing in apartments and the outcome is Pareto optimal.
If we have a rent-control law which does not allow rent-escalation clauses (at all or
adequately) but does allow departure-date contingent rentals, we once again get optimality. We
could then think of the landlord offering contracts like R (1),  R (2), ....  which says that you need25
make no monthly payment (it is easy to generalize and allow for some nominally-fixed  monthly
payment) but if you leave the apartment after t months you make a lump-sum payment of R (t).
In that case, it is easy to see that the competitive outcome is Pareto optimal.
In reality landlords do often mimic this system. They take initial deposits from tenants and
promise to return part of the money if the tenant leaves early.  The returns are however never
quite so finely-tuned as in the above paragraph, for fear of falling foul of rent-control laws.
What was described above as a competitive equilibrium may also be characterized as a
Nash equilibrium  of a game, as done by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, pp. 443-50) in
the context of Akerlof's (1970) model of adverse selection.  The characterization we prefer to use
is different from that of Mas-Colell et al.  They essentially construct a model of Bertrand
competition between two landlords (the assumption of "two" is without loss of generality in their
model) each of whom can supply an unlimited number of apartments at a cost of C each.  The
italicized part of the above sentence is clearly an unrealistic assumption. It is technically necessary
because the existence of capacity constraints can give rise to well-known existence problems.
We get around this problem with a different description of the game.  While avoiding the
above assumption is the strength of our formulation, the disadvantage is that the behavior of the
tenants is not fully explained in our model.  Instead it is specified simply by appealing to intuition.
Given sutch  behavior, the landlords play a formal game, and we isolate a refinement of the Nash
equl Ibria  which mimics competitive equilibrium.
In our model there are m (potential) landlords where m exceeds the total number of
tenants. t.  Each landlord can offer at most one apartment for lease.  If she does so, then she
incurs a one time cost of C.  Each landlord's strategy set, S, is equal to  {N}  U[0, x) . If landlord i
chooses N, it means she does not enter the rental market or, equivalently, does not offer an26
apartment for lease.  In that case she does not incur C and her profit is zero.  If she chooses a
strategy  R i E  [0, cc)  it means she offers an apartment for lease.  Her profit then depends on Ri and
other landlords' choice of strategies.  The nature of the payoff function is explained later.
We are essentially looking  for  a strategy  m-tuple  (si,  ... , si,_)  s which  is a Nash
equilibrium. We are however not interested in looking at any Nash equilibrium - but a certain
refinement of it, which we shall call a "single-peaked Nash equilibrium." A rental value of R is a
single-peaked Nash equilibrium if m-t landlords choose strategy N and all the other t landlords
choose the same rent R E [O,  a ) and these strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium.
In order to locate the single-peaked Nash equilibria we need to specify the nature of the
payoff functions.
The payoff functions of the landlords are assumed to have the following properties: (a) If
among all the landlords who chose to enter, i selects the smallest rent Ri, then landlord i expects a
payoff of E(R 1) - C.  (b) If t landlords enter and all but one of them charge the same rent R and
the deviant charges R' >R, then the deviants' expected profit is -C.
(a) is a very natural assumption.  The person charging the lowest rent has the pick of the
entire set of tenants who are willing to lease in and she chooses 1 at random.  (b) is a stronger
assumption but it mimics the idea the idea of competition. It says that if every landlord charges
the same rent R, then if one landlord tries to raise the rent, no tenant will come to her.  This is a
standard assumption in competitive models though we know that strictly speaking this is valid
only if there is a continuum of agents.
Given these assumptions, the single-peaked Nash equilibria of this m-person game
coincides exactly with the competitive equilibria described above.  In Figure 2 if the cost is C, the27
only single-peaked Nash equilibrium is R  and if the cost is C'  the only single-peaked Nash
equilibrium  is R'.
The only case where we can get multiple equilibria is the non-generic special case where
the cost, C, is such that the horizontal line  just touches a peak. That is, there exists i < n such that
E(D/vi) = C. Barring this special case, a rental, R, is a competitive equilibrium or a single-peaked
Nash equilibrium  if
R  =  mmin  {RIE(R)  =C}.
IV. Endogenous Quit Decisions
There are several directions in which one can modify and extend the above model.  We
will in this section consider one involving the endogenization of the tenant's  type.  It is true that
some people are inherently prone to moving and some have transferable jobs.  But no matter what
the inherent penchants, people do modify their behavior depending on the conditions in the rental
market.  If inflation is very high and a rent-control order holds the nominal rent constant for
sitting tenants. inherently peripatetic individuals may try to change their ways and stay put in one
place, and some people with transferable jobs may quit such jobs.  In this section we shall trv to
show that the endogenization of tenant types can generate some very interesting results, including
the generic possibility of multiple equilibria. Moreover, the removal of rent control can result in a
uniform lowering of rents.
Let us consider the case where all tenants are innately  identical but they can choose to be
one of two types: 1 and 2.  The assumption of ex ante identity is inessential and is made for ease28
of explanation. Type i changes his apartment every t, months where t, < t2. In other words, a
tenant chooses to be a short-stayer or a long-stayer.  Again, for reasons of simplicity, let us
assume t2 = cx.  In other words a potential tenant has to decide whether to be a short-stayer or
settle down permanently in a rented apartment.  Let us see what happens if we have the kind of
second-generation rent control discussed in the previous section.  In other words, every time a
landlord gets a new tenant she can fix the nominal rent, R, which then remains unchanged as long
as the tenant stays.
To motivate the tenant's  decision problem, let us consider alternative life strategies for the
tenant.  If a tenant decides on a career path in which he moves to take up a better job, wherever
such opportunities arise, he will be a short stayer and his expected life-time wage-income is Wi.
If alternatively he chooses a life where he stays in one place and takes up whatever job he gets in
the vicinity, he is a long stayer and his expected life-time wage-income is W2. We assume, what
seems reasonable enough, that W>W2.
Suppose the market rent is R.  A person who decides to be a tenant will choose to be a
short stayer if and only if
WI - Rv1 Ž W2 - Rv2
or  [W 1 - W 2] 2 vI -v 2 ]R.
By Lemma 1, we know that the right-hand term is positive. Hence, there exists a critical rent size.
R, such that if R < R,  tenants prefer being of type 1 and if R> R, tenants prefer to be of type 2.
Clearly,
R  v= -v 2 (10)
v 1 -29
Let us, as in the end of section III, describe the outcome of the rental market by thinking
of this as a game among the m landlords.  As before m > t, where t is the number of potential
tenants.  For simplicity assume D is very high; so the potential tenants always choose to be
tenants.  A tenant's crucial decision now pertains to what type he will be.  If all landlords charge
the same rent, R, each tenant's choice has already been described.  If R < R,  each tenant chooses
to be of type 1. Otherwise he is of type 2.
Let us denote this decision by the function T: [0, oc)  1  {1,2}. T(R)=1 if and only if
R S R.  Thus T(R) tells us what type the tenants will be, if there is only one rent prevailing in the
market, that is, R.  Now, consider the case where, with all the landlords charging R, one landlord
deviates to  R'.  What can the deviant landlord expect? As in section III, we assume that if
R' >R, she expects to find no tenants.  If R' <R, tenants will of course come to her, but the
question is what life-style will the tenant choose: short-staying or long-staying?  It seems to us,
and this is what we will assume, that all tenants will be of type T(R) - even the tenant who rents at
rate R'  from the deviant landlord. More formally, in the language of games used at the end of
section III, we assume the following: (c) If t landlords enter the rental market and all but one of
them charges a rent of R and one landlord charges a rent R' <R, then the tenants attracted by the
deviant landlord will be of type T(R).
This assumption seems to be intuitively very reasonable.  Suppose you live in a city with a
second-generation rent control law in which every landlord, except one, charges a very high rent.
The one exception is your landlord who charges a low rent of R'.  Suppose if every landlord
charged R'  you would have adopted the short-staying life style (involving moving every time you
got a better job).  What will you do when only your landlord charges R'?  There seems little30
rational motivation for you to adopt the short-staying life-style. In fact, when you see the harsh
rental market condition all over the city, you will have an extra reason to stay put where you are.
Figure 3 considers the case in which all landlords charge the same rent R and the thick line
shows each landlord's expected life-time rental income, E(R).  Note that if
R  R  (W  -W 2 )/(VI -v 2 ), all tenants are of type I and if R>R,  all tenants are of type 2.
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Now suppose (as in section III) a landlord's cost of leasing out an apartment is C (as
shown in the figure).  To fix our attention on the interesting case we consider one where the
horizontal line at C intersects E(R) more than once (at rents RL and RH). Unlike in section 3, here
both RL and RH constitute competitive equilibria  or, equivalently, single-peaked Nash equilibria.31
To see this, first take the easy case where rent is RL.  Since RLVI=C,  landlords earn a zero profit.
Since, for all R < R.L Rv, < C, no landlord can do better by under-cutting the market rent.
Neither can a landlord do better by raising the rent unilaterally since no tenant will come to her
(see assumption (b) in section III).
Next consider the case where the market rent is RH. Landlords' profits are zero, but it
seems, at first sight, that an individual landlord can do better by charging a lower rent--anything
between RL  and  R.  Suppose one landlord does undercut the market rent and charges
R E (RL, R].  She will have no problem getting a tenant of course.  However the tenant who
moves in will not behave like a type 1 tenant, because if he gives up this tenancy there is no
reason for him to expect that he will again find an apartment for R.  Remember that all but one
landlord is charging a rent of RH. Hence, through a unilateral rental under-cutting one cannot
hope to change the tenant's  behavior from type 2 to type 1. Hence, the deviating landlord's
expected profit will be Rv 2-C.  This is non-positive for R  E (RL, R].  So no one benefits from
deviating from RH,  which is a competitive equilibrium. For a formal game-theoretic argument we
have to merely cite assumption (c) above to explain why it does not pay to undercut the rent RH.
The argument that explains the possibility  of multiple equilibria  given second-generation
rent control is based on the assumption that there are limits to the number of apartments a single
landlord can offer (for simplicity assumed to be one in this paper).  If a landlord could under cut
RH by offering R'  E (R L, R]  and supply a large number of apartments at that rent, she may be
able to cause tenants to alter their life's strategy from being long-stayers to short-stayers.  In other
words (c) would then no longer hold, and so RH  would cease to be a single-peaked Nash
equilibrium. But in any metropolitan city it does seem reasonable to assume that no single32
landlord can cause such a large infusion of apartments as to induce tenants to alter their life
strategy.
Finally, let us see what happens when there is no rent control, that is, we have a
contractual system.  Clearly then RH will cease to be an equilibrium, because landlords can write
type-contingent contracts,  So a landlord can deviate to a rent such as  R and make it contractual
on the tenant quitting after t 1 periods.  It is easy to see that the only equilibrium is at RL in Figure
3.
In a contractual system, this same contract can be written in many different ways.  One is
to set rent at RL per month with the understanding that the tenant quits after ti periods (or,
equivalently, adjust the real rent up to RL after every t, periods).  Another equivalent contract is
to set the first month's rent at RL and then have an inflation clause, such that the kh month's
nominal  rent is RL  /3k-  .
The essential upshot is that under second-generation rent control, both RH and RL  can be
equilibria. Whereas under the contractual system only RL is.  Suppose the second-generation rent
control is in effect and it is the bad equilibrium, i.e. RH,  that somehow comes into being.  In
comparison to this a system of no-rent-control (and instead free contract) is not only Pareto
efficient  but it is Pareto dominant.  The removal of rent control will result in all rents going down.
All tenants are better off. They can choose the preferred life-style  with a greater life-time income
of W 1. This also hints at an important link, which may be worth exploring in the future, between
rent-control regimes and the labor market.  As the above analysis suggests, certain kinds of rent-
control regimes can make the labor market more inflexible,  with workers not responding to wage
differentials  because they do not wish to give up the advantages of being a sitting tenant.  It is33
likely that India's labor market has been affected adversely by the urban rent control laws; this is
clearly a matter deserving independent inquiry.
V.  Extension: Turnover Costs
In this section we explore an extension to our model in which the landlord incurs turnover
costs.  Turnover costs are common in the rental housing market and typically consist of cleaning,
repainting and renewing worn out appliances (and furniture if apartment includes furniture) upon
vacancy.
Let us consider the case where there exists a fixed turnover cost which the landlord has to
pay each time a tenant vacates an apartment. In this case, every time a tenant leaves, the landlord
has to incur a transaction cost of 4 (for cleaning, re-painting, and so on).  Then in (1) we need to
add the term  -5ti  to the right-hand side and that will mean (2) would be:
I - ((1)1ti  )tiX
V  (-6 t i)(I-  36)  I-  (1t1
The hat on the vi is to mark out this general case.  In other words,  vi is the present value
of income earned by a landlord if she charges a nominal monthly rent of $1 in real terms for every
new tenant, gets only tenants of type i and incurs a cost of 4 every time a tenant quits.  We define
the cost term of equation 11 as:
(Di  (,  (12)
It is easy to see that  Di < (Dj  , for all i > j.  Therefore there is now a tension between the benefits
to the landlord from a short-stayer, that rents are not eroded as much as with a long-stayer, and
the costs, that turnover costs are incurred more frequently. This can lead to even more types of34
tenants being kept out of the market.  Define (1 P(i) as expected present turnover costs to the
landlord when all tenants of type i or above make themselves available to the landlord as tenants.
We can then write  v(;)  as v(i)  - (PO), or:
n
v(i)  =  V(i) - n  _(13)
1-J=t
J  Pj
If the rent is R and only tenants of type i and higher seek tenancy, we now denote the landlords
present value of income from leasing out one apartment by v(I)  (R). From equations (8), (9) and
(12) it is clear that,
V(i)  (R) = Rv(n)  - ¢(i)  (14)
It is now easy to see that with this specification it is no longer generally true that if i <  j,
v()> V(j), and so from the landlord's point of view the shortest stayers are no longer necessarily
the ideal tenants.
The tension between the desirability of oft-reset rents and undesirability of frequent
turnover costs can potentially alter the equilibrium  from section III.  Shorter stayers are likely
excluded from the rental market by landlords who want to avoid frequent turnover costs.  They
accomplish  this by setting rents high enough so that short-staying tenants exit the market.
Therefore turnover costs can lead to the exclusion of tenant types that would not have been35
excluded in the absence of these costs.  This leads to a market outcome that is worse, in the
Pareto sense, than the outcome without turnover costs.
VI.  Conclusion
Rent control laws have been enacted in many municipalities  in many countries around the
world, making them one of the most popular public policy prescriptions among metropolitan
governments.  Unfortunately, knowledge of the effects of rent control is inadequate for such a
widespread phenomena, especially knowledge of second-generation rent control.  This paper has
constructed a general model of second-generation rent control.  We began by describing a stylized
rent control system that captures the essential elements of most second-generation rent control
systems: Restrictions on rent escalation and the eviction of sitting tenants and curbs on the use of
departure date contingent contracts.  These restrictions give rise to an asymmetric information
problem where landlords prefer to rent to tenants who stay in an apartment for only a short time,
but they are unable to tell tenant types at the time of rental.
We proceed to show that this kind of rent control system, with asymmetric information
and exogenously given tenant types (the 'type'  of a tenant being identified in terms of how long a
tenant expects to stay in the same apartment), can lead to outcomes that are Pareto sub-optimal.
Free contracting, however, allows the agents in this model to overcome the asymmetric
information problem.  We then study the case of endogenously determined tenant types, that is, a
model in which how long a tenant stays in one place is decided by the tenant on the basis of
market signals. This captures the fact that many agents make lifestyle choices depending on the
conditions of the rental housing market and may choose to remain in a city where he or she
occupies a rent controlled apartment even though a higher paying  job is available in another city.36
Endogenizing the tenant's type give rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria in our model.
Removal of rent control laws can not only increase efficiency in the rental market, but can also
lead to a general lowering of rents, making all tenants better off.  Finally, turnover costs are added
to the model which creates a tension between the desirability of short staying tenants, as they
allow rents to be reset to market values often, and the undesirability of short stayers, because
frequent vacation of apartments increases the incidence of turnover costs for the landlord.
A number of empirical implications arise form our model.  Since landlords cannot write
departure date contingent contracts or have a rent escalation clause included in the contract, the
landlord must set initial rents higher to compensate for the erosion of real rents suffered during
occupancy.  This should lead to across the board higher rents in rent controlled apartments that
are being offered on the market (vacant apartments) than comparable offerings in non rent
controlled cities.  One would also expect to find evidence of a tenure discount in rent controlled
cities (as does Borsch-Supan, 1986), where tenants who have rented the same apartment for many
years pay considerably less in rent than do tenants who have only just recently taken possession of
an apartment.  The construction of new housing should not necessarily be any less frequent in a
rent controlled city, because, as in our perfect competition model, we show that landlords do no
worse under rent control than they would have without it (as in Olsen, 1990).  An important
implication of the model is that rent control might decrease the mobility of the labor force.  As
sitting tenants are reluctant to move from a rent controlled apartment, they are less likely to
accept a higher paying job in another city.  Therefore, empirically,  we would expect to find that
the average tenure of renters is much higher in rent controlled cities than in non rent controlled
cities (some evidence of this is found in Olsen, 1990). The received empirical evidence generally
supports these hypotheses, drawing a picture remarkably similar to the one that is implied by our37
model, but the scarcity of detailed empirical evidence suggests that there is still work to be done
in this area.
From the above set of results, it is easy to get the idea that the optimal policy solution is to
free the rental housing market of all government restrictions.  We caution the reader from
extending this logic too far, however.  As we discuss earlier in the paper, free contracting in the
rental housing market, in the sense that we use it, really implies a considerable role for
governments.  The government provides the framework in which contracts are enforced, and
though in our model the absence of rent control was associated with a system of free contract,
there will in reality be three important kinds of limits on the range of contracts allowed.  First,
since every society considers  certain kinds of activities illegal, a contract that specifies the use of
some illegal activity would naturally not be recognized even if both parties voluntarily agree to it.
A contract which entails the landlord killing a tenant who fails to pay the rent would belong to this
category.  Secondly, a contract which adversely affects an uninvolved 'third party' (that is,
someone who is not a signatory to the contract) would be considered illegal. Finally, what one
has to keep in mind is that, in this age of lawyers, contracts can soon become so complicated that
it becomes virtually impossible for the signatories to fully understand what exactly they are
agreeing to.  In such a scenario, the more savvy can 'trap'  the others into transactions that they
would not have got into if they understood the full ramifications of the contract.  To prevent this
from happening, a practical response is to set some broad limits to the range of permitted
contracts.  To the extent that rent controls are themselves partly the consequence of a well-
meaning attempt to restrict the range of contracts, one has to exercise caution and commonsense
when limiting the terrain of possible contracts.  What our model suggests is that the class of
possible contracts should include rent escalation clauses, tenancy termination clauses and in
general, contracts involving terms which are departure date contingent.  This freedom of choice38
allows  tenants  and landlords  to overcome  the asymmetric  information  problem  and reaches  not
only  Pareto efficiency  but may  result  in across-the-board  lower housing  rentals than  what occurs
in the presence  of rent control.39
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